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EDITORIAL PREFACE TO THIS VOLUME
By

JOSEPH

H. DRAKE

I. THE AUTHOR AND THE TRANSLATOR. Rudolf J.
von Ihering was born at Aurich, in East Friesland, on
August 22, 1818. He was descended from a long line
of lawyers and administrators. Following the family
tradition he studied law, hearing lectures at Heidelberg, Munich, Gbttingen and Berlin. He received his
doctor degree from the University of Berlin in 1842,
with a dissertation entitled "De Hereditate Possidente." In the following year he began work as an
instructor in law. He became professor of law at Basel
in 1845, was called to Rostock in 1846, to Kiel in 1849,
to Giessen in 1852, and to Vienna in 1868. In 1871 he
was recalled from Austria to the newly established German university at Strassburg. After one year's residence here he received a call to G6ttingen, where he
continued to teach until his death, on September 17,
1892, declining calls to Leipsic and Heidelberg. During
his stay at Vienna he received his title of nobility from
the Emperor of Austria.
The first volume of "Der Zweck im Recht" was published in 1877; the second volume, not until 1883. The
English work here presented is a translation of the first
volume of the 4th German edition, published by Breitkopf and Hiirtel (Leipsic, 1903). The other published
works of the author are: "Abhandlungen aus dem
r6mischen Rechts" (Leipsic, 1844); "Zivilrechtsfaille
ohne Entscheidung" (Leipsic, 1847; 11th edition, Jena,
1909); "Der Geist des rimischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwickelung" (4 vols., Leipsic, 1852-1865; 5th and 6th editions, Leipsic, 1906-
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07); "Ueber den Grund des Besitzschutzes" (Jena, 1868;
2nd edition, Jena, 1869); "Die Jurisprudenz des tdglichen Lebens" (Jena, 1870; 13th edition, Jena, 1908);
"Der Kampf ums Recht" (Regensburg, 1872; 17th edition, Vienna, 1910); "Vermischten Schriften juristischen
Inhalts" (1879); "Gesammelte Aufsatze" (3 vols., 1881);
"Das Trinkgeld" (Brunswick, 1882; 3rd edition, 1889);
"Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudence" (Leipsic, 1885;
10th edition, Leipsic, 1909); "Der Besitzwille; Zugleich eine Kritik der herrschenden juristischen Methode"
(Jena, 1889). After his death there appeared "Die
Vorgeschichte der Indo-Europaer" (Leipsic, 1894) and
"Die Entwickelungsgeschichte des r5mischen Rechts"
(Leipsic, 1894). In 1852, he established along with
Gerber the "Jahrbticher ffir die Dogmatik," which
immediately became one of the most important legal
periodicals of Germany, a position due in great part to
Ihering's contributions to it.
A sketch of his life by Mitteis may be found in "Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie," Vol. L. A very interesting and sympathetic account of him as a scholar,
teacher and man was published by Munroe Smith in
the articles entitled, "Four German Jurists" ("Political
Science Quarterly," Vol. 10, pp. 664-692 and Vol. 11,
pp. 278-309). A critical appreciation of him by his pupil
and life-long friend, Adolf Merkel, appeared in the
"Jahrbicher ffir die Dogmatik" shortly after his death.
This has been translated and published in this volume
in Appendix I.
"Der Kampf ums Recht" has been translated into English, under the title of "The Struggle for Law," by
John J. Lalor of the Chicago Bar. Chicago: Callaghan
and Company, 1879. "Die Jurisprudenz des tdglichen
Lebens" has been trdnslated by Henry Goudy, D. C. L.,
Regius Professor of Civil Law in the University of Ox-
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ford, under the title of "Law in'Daily Life." Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1904.
The translator of the present volume, Dr. Isaac
Husik, is a Ph.D. of the University of Pennsylvania.
He is Instructor in Hebrew,. Gratz College, Philadelphia and a Lecturer on Philosophy in the University
of Pennsylvania, a member of the American Philosophical
Association, of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and of the Third International Congress
of Philosophy, held at Heidelberg, September, 1908.
He has written articles on the Aristotelian philosoply
and other topics, and is well known as an authority in
mediaval philosophy.
II.

BENTHAM AND

IHERING.

To American lawyers

Ihering is known as the German Bentham. The similarities between them are due rather to the facts that
they thought along the same lines, that each belonged
to a transition period in the legal thinking of his own
country, and that each suggested similar correctives for
the legal fallacies of his time and his environment, than
to any direct imitation of the English Utilitarian by the
German jurist. In the first volume of "Der Zweck im
Recht" it will be noted that Ihering makes but little
use of Bentham's ideas. In the second volume, published
six years after the first, when he comes to a presentation
of his own ethical theory, he cites Bentham as a commendable type of the earlier Utilitarians. He credits
Bentham (Vol. II, p. 133) with a very important contribution to ethical theory. "Those concepts which
appear but dimly in Leibnitz ('omne honestum publice
utile, omne turpe publice damnosum'), which Kant, too,
had before him in his 'supremely good' ('Weltbesten'),
Bentham first recognized with perfect clearness, and,
under the very appropriate name of Utilitarianism
developed into an independent ethical system." But

°°.i
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it is evident that Ihering uses Bentham's fundamental
concept merely as a starting point for his own philosophy. Taken as a point of departure, however, it is, as
Ihering himself says, of the greatest importance.
Bentham's basic maxim was that the test of right and
wrong is the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
He thought that in this he had discovered a principle of
ethical and legal calculus by the use of which ethical
norms and legal rules could be worked out which would
have absolute validity. "Nature," says Bentham, "has
placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure. The principle of utility
recognizes this subjection and assumes it as the foundation of that system. By the principle of utility is meant
that principle which approves or disapproves of every
action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of
the party whose interest is in question." This doctrine
is of course not new, but in Bentham's hands it was
turned from a philosophic doctrine into a political device
for the legislative reform of an effete legal system. It
commends itself for its simplicity. Find out what rules
are adapted to bring about the greatest happiness for
the greatest number, adopt these rules as laws by the
sovereign power of the state, and a political and legal
millennium is assured.
Though Ihering cites Bentham's basic concept with
approval, he also gives in his criticism of him the
distinction between his own social utilitarianism and
Bentham's purely subjective view. Utility was with Bentham that which was useful to the individual, and this
"subjectively useful is wrongly exalted as the measure
and criterion of the objectively and socially useful."
The good of the individual is never an end in itself but
only a means for accomplishing a social purpose. -An
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individual may act for his own happiness, but this is
to be done not in his own interest but in the interest of
society, and this relation of the individual to society
cannot be determined by "any abstract theoretical
formula, but by practical considerations." Bentham's
theory of law is a purely individualistic one. The law is
to be invoked as a means of securing and protecting the
welfare of the individual. This theory is more fully
elaborated by Mill and the later English Utilitarians.
With Ihering, on the other hand, law is a social force,
created by society, and to be used for the benefit of the
individual interest only in so far as the interest of the
individual coincides with the interest of society.
Bentham and Ihering are alike in espousing an imperative -theory of law, and both are brought to this not only
by natural bent, but also even more by their reaction
against the juristic thinking of their times. The earliest
incentive to Bentham's juristic efforts came by way of
repulsion to Blackstone. The doctrine of the original
contract had been appealed to by Blackstone to explain
the origin of society and law, and, although he disavowed
definite belief in it, he had not shown just how much he
really retained. He also speaks vaguely of a "natural
society" that appdrently grows out of the expanded
family, but closes this paragraph by saying that the
"original contract . . in nature and reason must
always be understood and implied in the very act of
associating together." Bentham pounced on this unfortunate wabble and, after rending in tatters Blackstone's verbose contradictions, substitutes for them the
simple principle of utility, which furnishes the only
clew to guide one through this maze. Blackstone's
definition of law was equally faulty. He puts in close
juxtaposition a traditional and an imperative theory of
law. Bentham boldly threw aside the traditional ele-
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ment in law, poured out the vials of his wrath on the
Blackstonian political optimism that lauded the system
of common law as the most perfect conceivable one, and
brought our whole system of jurisprudence to the test
of expediency, insisting that-all its provisions should be
brought by legislation to conform to the wants of men
and to the promotion of the greatest happiness.
As Blackstone is Bentham's bite noire, so is Puchta
that of Ihering. Savigny, the greatest German jurist
of the first half of the nineteenth century, reacting against
the natural law concepts of the preceding generation,
had set forth with wonderful scholarly acumen and
broad historical grasp the idea that law is, like language, an historical product of the life of a people. This
seems to carry with it by implication a sort of legal
fatalism. The jurist can have but little influence in
determining how the law is to develop. His activity as
an historian is limited to a study of what is and has
been in legal phenomena and his juristic philosophy to
a generalization of the principles which explain these
facts. Savigny, as a practical jurist and historian of the
law, was never carried off his feet into the whirlpool
of juristic metaphysical speculation; but Puchta, his
contemporary, who was more philosopher than jurist,
indulged to the full the Teutonic tendency toward
abstract generalization. Ihering's expressions of disgust with these philosophic vagaries, as uttered by himself in the latter part of his "Scherz und Ernst" and in
the preface to "Der Besitzwille," remind one of the
opening paragraphs of Bentham's "Fragment on Government," with his like condemnation of Blackstone.
Ihering brought "the jurisprudence in the air" down to
"a jurisprudence of realities." Denying that law was
only a growth which men could simply observe and
from the observation work out the principles which they
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saw developed, he asserted that law was also, and predominantly, the realization of a purpose, and that this
purpose had been and could be attained only by struggle.
Furthermore, this purpose was a social purpose and had
for its aim the securing of the interests of the individual
only so far as society recognized them.
Neither Bentham nor Ihering was a practical lawyer.
To neither will the thoroughgoing metaphysician allow
the title of philosopher, but to each is unanimously conceded the name of a great legal genius. Bentham brings
all legal facts to a focus about his central idea that legislation must be shaped with reference to the greatest
good for the greatest number. Ihering makes- much of
the proposition that the sense of right and justice must
constantly affect the social purpose of law, and that our
legal system must constantly be reshaped to allow the
exercise of this purpose. The end and aim of Bentham's
life work was codification and, although he did not live
to see the Reform Bill of 1832, it is generally admitted
that his life-long insistence on the simplicity, possibility and supreme desirability of law reform was one of
the principal instrumentalities in starting the making
over of law by legislative enactment, which has been the
most characteristic feature of legal history of England
during the century that has elapsed since his death.
The codifying activity of Ihering was hardly more than
an episode in his very active career. As a conclusion of
his "Possessory Intention," he gives us some criticism
of the first draft of the German Civil Code, and in the
final draft of that wonderful instrument a few provisions
are conceded to have been affected by his doctrines, but
his actual part in shaping the form of the great German
codification is not to be compared with that exerted by
many of his contemporaries.
III. IHERING'S MESSAGE. Ihering's criticism of
Puchta, of Savigny and of the Roman jurist, Paulus, -
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whom he laughingly insults by calling him the Puchta of
the classical world - is indicative of his revolt against
the juristic tendencies in Germany in the middle of the
nineteenth century, tendencies which are apparently
still operative in America in this first quarter of the
twentieth century. The jurist Paulus, in his endeavor
to systematize the law of possession, had assigned as
the reason for the fact of possession, the intention of the
holder to possess. He gave this as the logical reason for
the existence of certain anomalous rules of possession
existing in the Roman law of the classical period. Ihering
boldly announced that these rules had no logical explanation, but had arisen simply because of accidents in the
historical development of the doctrine of possession
in Roman law. Savigny had devoted his life to the careful working out of certain legal principles which in the
course of history had been developed in the Roman
law. Puchta had attempted to fashion these principles
into a philosophic system and to crystallize them in a
body of dogmatic juristic doctrine possessing a philosophic validity.
In our Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, Coke,
in the earlier period, and Blackstone, in the later,
have played the part of a Paulus in their giving of nave
and superficial reasons for the legal anomalies of our
system. The careful investigation of the historical
sources of our law and the presentation of the results
in case-books and treatises, which have absorbed the
energies of our best English and American legal scholars
during the life of the past generation, have performed
for our law a service comparable to that rendered to
Roman law by the great Savigny; but we find among
our own historical scholars a tendency similar to that
found among the followers of Savigny, to rest content
with this historical achievement and to ignore or even
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xxiii

to ridicule the possibilities of directing by philosophic
prevision the development of law in the future. As an
example of this somewhat contemptuous attitude toward
law as it ought to be, note the disparaging reference to
the "philosophic jargon of the German" made by one
of our most distinguished representatives of the English
historical school of jurists. On the other hand, we find
many a Puchta among our American jurists, both on
and off the bench, who apply the principles that have
been worked out in the development of our Common
Law as though they were "a priori" mathematical axioms
and not "a posteriori" working formulae, which have to
be constantly reshaped to adapt them to the ever changing requirements of a developing society.
American juristic thinking at the present time needs
a von Ihering. Our jurists, our legislators and our
courts, both bench and bar, are still holding fast to an
historical "Naturrecht" built up on the precedents of
the Common Law, which has many analogies to the type
of juristic thinking in vogue in Germany during the first
half of the nineteenth century. All of our lawyers,
judges and legislators who are trained in the traditions
of the Common Law hold with characteristic and commendable professional conservatism to the good that is
and has been in our legal system, insisting, too, upon
the prime virtue of a system of law that is certain, but
apparently forgetting that law is not an end in itself
and as such to be brought to a state of formal and static
perfection, but that the end is the good of society. The
public is crying out against our crystallized and inelastic
theory and practice of law. The proper application of
the idea of law as purpose would, in many cases, loosen
our legal shackles and open the way out of our legal
difficulties.
This idea of Ihering may not be the last word on the
philosophy of law. Possibly the criticism made by some

xxiv

EDITORIAL PREFACE

of his German successors that it is not a philosophy at
all may be well founded. But it certainly is an uplifting
and inspiring idea and is not too far ahead of our own
prevalent juristic thinking to make the adoption of it a
practical impossibility for us. In those very difficult
cases where our judges are confronted with the task of
extending a principle of law to meet a new set of facts
which call loudly for a remedy, if the courts had the idea
that the purpose of law was to satisfy properly our changing social demands, we should have fewer reactionary
decisions that have caused so much popular discontent
with the law - decisions which are justified by the courts
handing them down, by the arguments that there are
"no precedents" in the Common Law for them, or that
to extend the principle will "open the flood-gates of litigation." The days of "laissez faire" in legal matters
have gone by in America as well as in Germany. We,
too, must recognize that our historical Common Law is
not sufficient for the demands of present day life unless,
by our struggles with a purpose, we can add to the law
as it is and has been, some of the principles of the law as it
ought to be, in order to satisfy our growing social needs.

